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This paper presents a generalized model of overlapping generations with economic aging of 
households. Economic age is defined as a set of personal attributes such as earnings potential 
and tastes that are characteristic of a person's position in the life-cycle. We separate the 
concepts of economic age and time since birth in assuming only a small number of different 
states of age. Agents sharing the same economic characteristics are aggregated analytically to 
a low number of age groups. The model thus allows for a very parsimonious approximation 
of life-cycle differences in earnings, wealth and consumption. As an illustration, we 
quantitatively apply the model to study the impact of demographic change. 
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Modeling the behavior of overlapping generations (OLG) of households is important to
understand many topics of ﬁscal policy and intertemporal macroeconomics. Depending
on the particular issues to be analyzed, economists have a range of models at hand. At
o n ee x t r e m ee n di st h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n tm o d e lo fi n ﬁnitely lived consumers due to
Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), and Weil (1987). At the other end is
the two period OLG model pioneered by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). The
model is analytically very tractable but cuts down life-cycle detail to the bare bones. The
length of a period featuring constant interest rates and constant rates of consumption
etc. covers about thirty years in real time which imposes severe limits in quantitative
empirical applications. At the expense of analytical tractability, empirical applications
thus rely on numerically solved models with a large number of generations and detailed
life-cycle patterns of earnings, consumption and savings. These models were pioneered by
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and Hubbard and Judd (1987) for the analysis of tax and
ﬁscal policy including demographic change and social security reform.
Life-cycle models with many generations tend to be analytically intractable and must
be solved numerically. Even the simplest life-cycle model with 55 cohorts operates in
a state space of as many as 108 dimensions as Laitner (1990) has shown. Dimensions
explode if one adds additional structure and household sector heterogeneity such as human
capital accumulation, diﬀerent skill groups, several countries etc. By way of contrast, the
perpetual youth model due to Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985) and Buiter (1988) is an
analytically very tractable OLG model with a realistic period length. The main drawback,
however, is the rigid demographic assumption of an age independent mortality rate and
the absence of life-cycle detail of earnings, consumption and savings.1 For this reason, the
model is not well suited for the analysis of aging, old age insurance and other applications
where it is necessary to distinguish households by age groups. The recent extension by
1Heijdra and Romp (2005), however, managed to include some life-cycle features in a continuous time
version of the model that still allows for analytical solutions.
3Gertler (1999) reconciles the perpetual youth model with an important aspect of life-
cycle behavior by allowing for a stochastic transition from work to retirement and from
retirement to death. It thereby opens up useful applications with a model that includes no
more than two stock variables to represent the household sector. Although more complex,
it is analytically tractable and easily implemented empirically. However, it does not allow
any further disaggregation between diﬀerent age groups of workers and retirees.2
This paper presents an alternative approach that retains the simplicity of analytically
aggregated OLG models and yet succeeds to approximate the rich life-cycle detail of
the high dimensional ﬁnite horizon models. The number of state variables is drastically
reduced, depending on the desired degree of approximation. The key idea is to separate
the concept of “economic age” from “time since birth”. We understand economic age as a
set of physical or mental attributes such as earnings potential, mortality, tastes and other
characteristics. They are retained several periods before agents move to the next age
s t a t e .T h i si st h ek e yd i ﬀerence to existing models where aging and the passing of time
are perfectly synchronized and age is understood as time since birth. In introducing the
concept of economic age, we are thus able to introduce an approximate life-cycle structure
with a much reduced number of state variables and yet retain a period length of one year
for realistic short-run and transitional dynamics.
W i t he c o n o m i ca g i n g ,p e o p l em o v es t o c h a s t i c a l l yf r o mo n ea g es t a t et oa n o t h e rw i t ha n
age group speciﬁct r a n s i t i o nr a t e .A l la g e n t ss h a r i n gt h es a m ee c o n o m i cc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa r e
analytically aggregated in the same age group. Our model is thus a natural generalization
of Gertler (1999). Gertler aggregates into two age groups, workers and retirees. However,
for many applications one needs to distinguish several worker groups to capture life-
cycle earnings detail, and also a few groups of retirees to take account of the substantial
heterogeneity among old and very old generations. Our generalized OLG model allows
for considerably more heterogeneity and thus achieves a much closer approximation of
2This decomposition is essential for many applications, see Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2007),
for example.
4empirical life-cycle properties. In this paper, we distinguish eight age (life-cycle) groups
and choose the economic characteristics to correspond to the average data of people
in their twenties, thirties etc. Another extension relative to Gertler is that we allow
for mortality also in younger age states for a closer approximation of the demographic
composition of the population. In fact, the number of age groups, and thereby the degree
of life-cycle approximation, can be variably chosen. Our generalized life-cycle model is
thus able to replicate a wide range of intertemporal household models as special cases
by appropriately choosing the parameters governing the mortality and aging process.3 In
the limit, when increasing the number of age states until they are equal to the number of
life-cycle periods, our model becomes identical to the Auerbach Kotlikoﬀ (1987) model.
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of economic age in a
generalized OLG model. We illustrate its application by analyzing two scenarios of de-
mographic change: a temporary baby boom and increasing life-expectancy leading to a
substantial aging of the population. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
how an agent’s life-cycle is approximated by deﬁning an arbitrary number of age states
with diﬀerent economic characteristics. It is then shown how all agents sharing the same
economic age are analytically aggregated into a single life-cycle group. Section 3 solves the
intertemporal optimization problem of households in the presence of mortality and aging
risks and sets up the dynamic general equilibrium model with demographic structure.
Henceforth, we use EA as a short-hand for the economic aging model. Section 4 presents
two illustrative empirical scenarios of demographic change, and section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Economic Aging
Age is commonly associated with time since birth. In standard life-cycle models, age
characteristics such as labor productivity, mortality, health and other individual attributes
3This is shown in the extended discussion paper version in Grafenhofer et al. (2006). The discussion
paper contains all proofs which are partly ommitted in this paper, and it applies the model to stylized
pension reform rather than demographic change.
5change from period to period so that there are as many states of age as there are life-cycle
periods. To reduce the state space, we approximate the life-cycle by a small number of
diﬀerent states of “economic age”, a ∈ (1,...,A). In this paper, we describe economic age
as by a vector of attributes (θ
a,γa,ωa), consisting of labor productivity θ
a, the probability
γa of not dying, i.e. of surviving to the next period, and the probability ωa of not aging,
i.e. of remaining in the same state of economic age. These characteristics change only
when an agent switches to the next stage of economic age. Economic aging is a discrete
event that occurs stochastically and irregularly. Agents may thus retain their state of
economic age for several periods before they switch to the next age state. We thus need
two diﬀerent clocks to measure the passing of real time since birth and the speed of
economic aging. The latter is determined by the probability ωa. We measure real time
in regular annual periods, with interest, prices and quantities appropriately deﬁned per
year. The aging clock runs slower and stochastically. If we had ω =1 , agents would age
from period to period so that economic and demographic aging would coincide.
2.1 Life-Cycle Histories
We deﬁne a discrete number of A states of economic age. Each state is characterized
by a given set of life-cycle characteristics. Age group a ∈ {1,...,A} collects all agents
sharing the same economic characteristics. People start life in state a =1with a given
set of attributes. An agent changes her life-cycle characteristics only when moving to the
next state of age a +1 . Since economic aging occurs less frequently than true aging as
measured by time since birth, households diﬀer not only by their date of birth, but also by
their diverse life-cycle histories. An agent’s life-cycle history is her biography of economic
aging events that have happened since birth. It is represented by a vector α that records
t h ep a s td a t e so fa g i n ge v e n t sw h e nt h ea g e n th a sm o v e df r o mo n et ot h en e x ts t a t e .A t
date t, the set of possible histories of a household belonging to age group a is
N
a
t ≡ {(α1,...,α a):α1 <...<α a ≤ t}. (1)
6A particular life-cycle history is represented by a vector α =( α1,...,α a) ∈ N a
t .T h e
element αi denotes the date at which the household who was formerly in age group i−1,
became a member of group i. The element α1 thus lists the date of birth. We say that
a member of group one aged only once with no further aging since birth. Nevertheless,
diﬀerent persons of the ﬁrst age group are heterogeneous since they were born at diﬀerent
moments in the past. The set of possible biographies is N 1
t = {(α1):α1 ≤ t}.B yt h es a m e
logic, α2 is the date when an agent moved from group 1 into 2. People in age group 2 have
aged twice. The set of life-cycle histories in this case is N 2
t = {(α1,α 2):α1 <α 2 ≤ t}.
By deﬁnition, a person belonging to group a has aged a times in total. Her biography
given by the vector α thus contains a elements.
Economic aging is assumed to occur infrequently and stochastically, implying that
agents spend variable lengths of time in a given age state. At any moment in time, an
individual with an arbitrarily given life-cycle history faces the risk of economic aging and
dying. She must reckon with three possible events: (i) she dies with probability 1 − γa;
(ii) she survives without aging and remains in the same age group with probability γaωa,
and (iii) she survives and ages and belongs to age group a+1next period with probability
γa (1 − ωa). A key assumption is that these transition probabilities are identically and
independently distributed among all agents in group a. They are thus the same for all
agents, independent of how long they already stayed in this age state. Individuals in the
last age group have exhausted the aging process and remain in this group with probability
one, ωA =1 . They may either survive with probability γA within group A or die with
probability 1−γA. Observe that only the last age group behaves according to the mortality
and demographic assumptions of Blanchard’s (1985) perpetual youth model.
Since economic characteristics diﬀer across age groups, an agent’s consumption, assets
and other economic variables will generally depend on her particular life-cycle history
which reﬂects how long she stayed in any of the past states of economic age. For example,
assets depend on the agent’s past earnings history which, in turn, is linked to her aging
trajectory. To keep track of the population’s heterogeneity, one must thus very carefully
7identify each agent by her age group as well as her aging biography α.T h e n u m b e r o f
agents at date t, in state of life a and with the same aging history α is given by Na
α,t.
People with the same biography are identical so that Na
α,t is the smallest homogeneous
population unit. They all face the same independent probability of moving to one of the
next, alternative states. With stochastically independent risks, the law of large numbers
implies so that the above stated individual probabilities correspond to the fraction of
people subject to the same demographic shock. Consequently, the group is divided into
three subgroups next period: (i) those who die and whose biography is updated to α†
where † means exit from the population; (ii) those who survive within the same age group
a. Their biography remains unchanged; and (iii) those who are hit by an aging event and




α,t · (1 − γa), death,
(ii) Na
α,t+1 = Na




α,t · γa (1 − ωa), aging.
(2)
T h el a s tl i n er e f e r st op e r s o n sw i t hb i o g r a p h yα =( α1,...,α a) ∈ N a
t w h ob e l o n gt oa g e
group a and experience an aging event in period t. These agents arrive in the next age
state a +1next period. Their biography is thus appended by a new entry t +1and
reads α0 =( α1,...,α a,t+1 )∈ N
a+1
t+1 .T h es e to fa g e n t sN
a+1
t+1 in group a+1can thus be
decomposed into two subsets: the ﬁrst consists of all those agents who already belonged
to group a+1in period t and whose biography α remains unchanged, just as in case (ii)
above referring to group a. The second subset refers to the new arrivals with a freshly
appended biography α0. This decomposition into movers and stayers becomes important
for analytical aggregation below.4
4The perspective in (2) is from period t to the next period and therefore distinguish between those
who stay and who leave age group a. The alternative perspective is from t +1by distinguishing the
incumbants (stayers) who already belonged to group a in the preperiod, (ii):Na
α,t+1 = Na
α,t · γaωa,a n d
the new arrivals (movers) who belonged to group a − 1 in t, (iii):Na
α0,t+1 = N
a−1




The total number of agents in the same economic demographic state a is obtained by









The stochastic arrival of aging events implies that currently living agents have spent
variable lengths of time in each preceding age state since birth. In consequence, there
are many diﬀerent aging trajectories leading to the same age state in period t.T h e
aggregation formula takes the sum over all possible biographies, including varying dates
of birth, that could conceivably lead to age state a in period t.
All agents in a given group are assumed in (2) to face identical transition probabili-
ties. Given stochastically independent mortality and aging risks, one can use the law of
large numbers to analytically aggregate the population into separate age groups. These
aggregates evolve deterministically over time. One obtains














A =1 . (4)







t + nt,n t ≡ N
1
(t+1),t+1 newborns. (5)
(c) The total population grows by
Nt+1 = Nt + nt −
P
a (1 − γ
a)N
a





Proof. The smallest homogeneous population unit is Na
α,t. It is assumed large enough
so that the law of large numbers applies. As indicated in (2), Na
α,t decomposes into three
groups. Members of group a can either die, or stay in the same group, or move to group
a +1next period. Conversely, agents in group a next period come from stayers α ∈ N a
t
9and movers from the preceding group N
a−1
t . Obviously, a stayer remains in the same
group a next period, α ∈ N a
t+1, while a mover belongs to N
a−1
t this period and N a
t+1 next
period. A mover gets a new entry t+1in her biography, α0 =( α1,...,α a−1,t+1 ) .G r o u p
a next period is populated by agents with biographies α ∈ N a
t+1.B yd e ﬁnition, it can be
decomposed into incumbents with biographies α ∈ N a
t , and new arrivals with biographies
α0 =( α,t +1 ) where α0 ∈ N a































t + γa−1 (1 − ωa−1)N
a−1
t .
Transition probabilities are identical for all members of the same group and independent
of past history. They can thus be moved in front of the sum operators. Since the last
group cannot age further, the event in (2.iii) is precluded, implying the restriction ωA =1 .
In the ﬁrst group, the inﬂow is the number of newborns nt who start life with a biography
α0 =( t +1 ) . Adding up (4-5) and noting the restriction ωA =1yields (6).
The key demographic parameters are the birth rate, the transition rates to successive
age groups, and the mortality rates. Since all are exogenous, the demographic subsystem
is independent of economic inﬂuences and evolves autonomously according to (4-6). A
stationary population requires that inﬂows and outﬂows of any age group must balance






γa−1 (1 − ωa−1)
1 − γaωa · N
a−1. (7)
For any demographic transition, the exogenous driving force is the ﬂow nt of newborns.
With this ﬂow exogenously speciﬁed and constant, the system arrives at a stationary
population N with demographic structure as in (7).
3 Life-Cycle Economies
The theory of economic aging is now combined with an intertemporal general equilibrium
model with life-cycle decisions and perfect foresight. In economic applications, a key
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There are several states of work and retirement life where aR denotes the ﬁrst age state
of retirement. Each worker in group a is endowed with θ
a eﬃciency units of labor which




t. The government levies a proportional wage tax tW to ﬁnance pensions and
other public spending. Retirees receive a pension of pt per capita from a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) social security system. Wage related income per capita, ya
t,d i ﬀers across age
groups due to varying labor productivity, but is identical for all agents within the same
group. Importantly, it does not depend on life-cycle history α which is generally diﬀerent
for people in the same age group.
3.1 The Last Age Group
With perfect foresight, today’s decisions must anticipate the consequences for future in-
come and welfare. To take account of this interdependency, we start with the last age
group and solve the model backwards. The last group is conceptually diﬀerent from ear-
lier ones because no further aging is possible (ωA =1 ). Consequently, the set of possible
events reduces to two. A person may either survive to the next period within the same
age group, or die. The decisions of the last age group basically follow the principles of
the perpetual youth model as in Blanchard (1985) albeit with one important diﬀerence.
Since the last is only one of several age groups, average time spent in this group is rather
limited. The mortality rate must thus be chosen much larger.
A member of the last age group is retired and receives an old age pension of yA
t = pt per
















11where C stands for consumption, A for assets, and R =1+r for the interest factor equal
to one plus the annual interest rate. The value of assets is measured at the end of the
period and earns, together with new savings y −C,a ni n t e r e s trt+1 until the end of next
period. The term γA on the left-hand side arises due to the assumption of reverse life-
insurance. The agent wants to get compensated during her life-time for any accidental
b e q u e s t st h a ts h el e a v e su p o nd e a t h .S u c hc o m p e n s a t i o ni sa s s u m e dt ob ea v a i l a b l ef r o m
a competitive insurance sector. The same demand for insurance arises for any age group.
Suppose an agent has assets of Sa
α,t at the end of period t, equal to the square bracket in




α. Since a fraction
1−γa dies, insurance ﬁrms collect assets (1 − γa)Sa, but premiums must be paid to those
who survive, adding up to πaγaSa. The insurance sector breaks even with a premium of
πa =( 1− γa)/γa or 1+πa =1 /γa. If such insurance is available, an agent’s assets next
period are Aa
α,t+1 = Rt+1 (1 + πa
t)Sa
α,t if she survives, or γAAA
α,t+1 = Rt+1SA
α,t as in (9).
Preferences are represented by the CES non-expected utility theory proposed by
Farmer (1990) and Weil (1990) which restrict individuals to be risk neutral with respect
to variations in income but allow for an arbitrary intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Let β be a subjective discount factor reﬂe c t i n gt h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,a n dσ
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Agents maximize expected welfare over the
remaining life-time. The recursive formulation of intertemporally separable preferences





















,σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ). (10)
As always in intertemporal models, we derive the familiar Euler equation of consumption
growth. A higher interest tilts the consumption proﬁle towards the future, relative to
a given life-cycle income proﬁle, and thus implies higher savings. The sensitivity with
respect to interest depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. One can now
obtain a closed form solution for consumption and indirect utility. At any date, agents
consume a fraction of their ﬁnancial and human wealth where the marginal propensity to
consume out of total wealth reﬂects present and future interest rates. Human wealth is
12the present value of expected pension beneﬁts of retirees as stated in (8).


















The inverse of the marginal propensity to consume, ∆A
t , and human wealth equal to the
present value of pension beneﬁts, HA











































Proof. See Grafenhofer et al. (2006).
O n em a yv e r i f yt h a tt h es o l u t i o ns a t i s ﬁes the intertemporal budget constraint that is
obtained by solving forward the periodic budget in (9). The economics of intertemporal
choice in the last age group is well known from the standard perpetual youth model.
3.2 Other Age Groups
The key diﬀerence to the last age group is that members of groups a<A ,b ei ta c t i v e
workers or retired persons, are subject to the risk of aging while the last group is not. If




. The mortality rate increases, labor productivity changes, or work in-
come is replaced by a pension when switching into retirement. Hence, a person’s expected










With probability ωa, the agent is not aging and expects welfare V a
α,t+1 next period. With
probability 1 − ωa, she ages, switches to the next higher age group and expects welfare
13V
a+1
α0,t+1. In this event, the agent’s biography must be updated as in (2) with an extra
entry t +1 . The Bellmann equation, referring to the optimization problem of an agent





















It is assumed, as in (9), that an actuarially fair, group speciﬁc insurance scheme is available



















The value of assets is measured at the end of the period and earns, together with new
savings y − C, an interest rt+1 until the end of next period. Note that a person inherits
t h es a m ea s s e tw e a l t hi np e r i o dt +1from savings in period t irrespective of whether he
ages or not.
We derive a modiﬁed Euler equation of consumption growth. It states that desired
consumption growth is a function of the expected interest rate relative to the subjective
discount rate implicit in β. The interpretation is similar to that for the old age group. A
higher interest tilts the consumption proﬁle towards the future, relative to the life-cycle
income proﬁle ya, and thus implies higher savings. A key diﬀerence to the last group
is the risk of aging, giving rise to a marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (MRS)
between two consecutive age states. Economic aging thus introduces a magniﬁcation
Ωa = ωa (1 + MRSa) of the interest factor when discounting forward looking variables.
The following closed form solution for consumption and welfare is obtained.
Proposition 3 Optimal consumption policy Ca
α,t and indirect utility V a
α,t are
(i) Ca




















































14The marginal propensity to consume is 1/∆ and H denotes human capital equal to the
present value of future wages and pension beneﬁts.
Proof. See Grafenhofer et al. (2006).
Note that an agent cannot age any further, ωA =1 , if she is in the last age state. In
that case, ΩA =1which yields the solution for the last age group as in proposition 2.
Second, if all age classes face the same survival probability γa = γ and thereby diﬀer only
in their earnings, then the marginal propensity to consume is invariant across age classes.
This is most easily seen in case of a unit elasticity σ =1which yields 1/∆ =1− βγ by
(17.iii), but is also true more generally. If ∆a+1 = ∆a,t h e nΛa as well as Ωa are both




t+1. Hence, ∆a must indeed be the same
for all groups. Age classes then diﬀer only in terms of human wealth and consumption
levels but all choose the same intertemporal consumption structure. This shows that the
change in the marginal propensity to consume from one age class to the next exclusively
reﬂects a change in the mortality rate.
Consider the most realistic case that the mortality rate increases between any two
consecutive groups. Again, the Cobb Douglas case shows most transparently that the
marginal propensity to consume 1/∆a =1− γaβ rises with a lower survival rate γa.
Given that the ratio ∆a+1/∆a falls below unity, and that ρ<0 for an intertemporal
substitution elasticity σ<1,t h ef a c t o rΛa exceeds one and thereby raises Ωa above one
as well. Agents start to discount the future more heavily, at an eﬀective rate ΩaR,a st h e
end of life becomes a more probable event. With a higher probability of extinction, agents
are less inclined to wait and thus consume a larger fraction of resources immediately. The
marginal propensity to consume thus increases as the last age state is approached which
is a key feature of life-cycle model in the tradition of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). In
fact, our model becomes identical to the Auerbach Kotlikoﬀ model when the number of
economic states of age approaches the number of life-cycle periods (set ωa =0 , see again
Grafenhofer et al., 2006, for a proof).
15In the EA model, all agents in a given state of economic age move to the next state with
the same transition rate ωa, and face the same survival rate γa.A si nt h ep e r p e t u a ly o u t h
model in the line of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965), a critical assumption necessary
for analytical aggregation below is that these rates are independent of how long agents
already spent in state a. This creates a large heterogeneity of economic aging patterns
with some agents moving very fast to retirement and others remaining in a productive
young state for many periods. It might be considered a weakness that the EA model
can produce quite unrealistic individual aging trajectories. However, the applications
are not concerned with individual trajectories but with the aggregate behavior of age
groups. In the aggregate, an age group replicates the average of the cohorts which deﬁne
the characteristics of this group as is emphasized in the calibration principles applied
in section 4 below. Another limitation might be that transition probabilities are not
shaped by individual behavior and that the demographic subsystem is independent of
economic decisions. While the analysis of the demographic scenarios in section 5 rests on
the assumption of exogenous fertility shocks, it should be possible to endogenize fertility,
for example, along the lines of Weil (2006). A ﬁnal restriction of the model is that all
characteristics of economic age such as wage and mortality rate change at the same time.
One might also question that individuals sharing the same wage in a given age group would
also share the same mortality rate. However, one might again argue that the value of the
model for macroeconomic analysis is in describing average life-cycle patterns resulting
from the aggregate behavior of age groups rather than tracing out the full heterogeneity
of individual life-cycle patterns.
3.3 Aggregation
The simplicity and tractability of the simple perpetual youth with a constant mortality
rate rests on the fact that it allows for analytical aggregation. The same applies to the
EA (economic aging) model. The advantage of approximating actual demographic and
life-cycle properties with a low dimensional system is possible only if age groups can be
16aggregated analytically. In section 2, we have argued that agents are uniquely identiﬁed by
their biography α which also includes the date of birth as a ﬁrst entry. In age group a,o n e
records at date t a mass of agents Na
α,t with the same life-cycle history. These agents are
economically identical and all consume the same quantity Ca
α,t. Aggregate consumption
of age group a is obtained by summing over all possible biographies. Economy wide

















The same principle applies to other static variables. When aggregating expressions
that multiply with variables identical within an age group, or identical over the entire
population, these constant terms drop out of the summation. For example, aggregating






t . Denoting labor supply in eﬃciency

























t . Similarly, when aggregating the con-




t are identical within each group. They implicitly depend on the common
interest rate and demographic parameters that diﬀer across age groups due to diﬀerent
mortality rates. Being forward looking, they are independent of history within each group.





The aggregation of human capital is particularly simple in this basic model since wage
related income and, thus, human capital per capita is the same for all persons within each
group. This is most easily seen by solving forward (12) which yields the same present
value of future income, discounted at a common rate, for all retirees. Writing the per
capita value as HA
α,t = hA
t , aggregate human capital is simply HA
t = hA
t NA
t .T h e s a m e



























17The law of motion for human capital per capita is repeated from (17.v-vi). The law of
motion for the oldest age group follows on account of the restriction ωA =1 , implying
ΩA =1 , and corresponds to the equation in (12).
























t + Y a
t − Ca
t denotes end of period assets. The proof is in Grafenhofer et
al. (2006). Note that the newborns entering the ﬁrst age group are bare of any assets
since the unborn members of age group 0 c a n n o ts a v eb yd e ﬁnition. Finally, total asset
accumulation amounts to





where Y is aggregate wage related income.
3.4 General Equilibrium
Production of output Qt is subject to a linear homogeneous, quasiconcave technology
F using capital Kt and eﬃciency units of labor Lt as inputs. For realistic dynamics
of investment in a small open economy, investment costs IC are assumed to increase
progressively with the rate of gross investment, reﬂecting installation costs of capital. The
capital installation technology is again assumed linear homogeneous, leading to investment
costs IC = φ(I,K),w h e r eI is the amount of gross investment, and φI > 0, φII > 0,
and φK < 0. As a normalization, we may specify δ = φ(δ,1),i m p l y i n gt h a tIC = I in a
steady state. Dividends χt are
χt = Qt − wtLt − I
C
t ,Q t = F (Kt,L t),I
C = φ(I,K). (23)
Deﬁning the end of period, cum dividend value of capital by V K, optimal investment
and employment policies follow from
V
K (Kt)=m a x
It,Lt
χt + V
K (Kt+1)/Rt+1 s.t. Kt+1 = It +( 1− δ)Kt. (24)
18Discounting with the households’ interest factor Rt+1 assures that the no arbitrage-
condition of investors is satisﬁed, i.e. the return on dividend generating capital must
equal the market rate of interest available on alternative assets. Denoting the shadow
price of capital by λ
K
t ≡ ∂Vt/∂Kt, the optimality and envelope conditions are
φI = λ
K
t+1/Rt+1,w t = FL,λ
K
t = FK − φK +( 1− δ)λ
K
t+1/Rt+1. (25)
It is well known since Hayashi (1982) that the marginal and average shadow prices of
capital are identical, V K
t ≡ λ
K
t Kt. Finally, note that in a steady state, I = δK.D u et o
our normalization of the adjustment cost function φ,w eh a v eφI =1and φK =0in a
steady state which yields the familiar condition FK = r + δ.
The model is closed by imposing the consolidated government budget constraint. Wage
taxes must ﬁnance public consumption G which is kept constant per capita of the total






t + Gt,G t = g · Nt. (26)
In equilibrium, demand for eﬃciency units of labor must correspond to household
sector labor supply, scaled by worker productivity. Further, accumulated private ﬁnancial
wealth must absorb the value of domestically issued equity, Vt+1, and foreign bonds Dt+1,
Lt = L
S
t ,A t+1 = V
K
t+1 + Dt+1. (27)
When assets are perfectly substitutable, they must earn an identical rate of return equal
to the market interest rt+1. Given optimal household and ﬁrm behavior, and with all
budget constraints fulﬁlled, Walras’ Law implies the current account
Dt+1 = Rt+1
£
Dt + Qt − I
C
t − Gt − Ct
¤
, (28)
where the stock of foreign net assets Dt is measured at the end of the period.
194 Calibration to Life-Cycle Data
In standard OLG models with an annual aging process the population is divided into
diﬀerent vintages or cohorts identiﬁed by the year of birth. In these “cohort” models,
individuals age every single period. There are thus as many age groups as cohorts, 55 as
in the original Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) model. The purpose of this section is to
show how the EA model incorporates life-cycle features even if one distinguishes only a
few age groups. The degree of approximation depends on the number of age groups and,
therefore, on the number of state variables. By drastically reducing the state space in this
way, one can greatly simplify the quantitative, empirical analysis of life-cycle economies.
In the end, one must decide on a trade-oﬀ between life-cycle accuracy and the dimensions
of the numerical model. In all cases, however, the EA model allows for a period length of
one year, independent of the number of age groups chosen which is important for short-run
and transitional dynamics.
4.1 Demography and Wage Proﬁles
The empirical implementation of the EA model on real population data rests on the fact
that it contains the annual cohort model as a special case. For simplicity, we consider a
demographic stationary state and, thus, ignore time indices. Setting ωa =0in equation
(4) implies that an aging event occurs with probability one in each period, leading to
˜ Nt =˜ γt−1 ˜ Nt−1. The concept of an age group thus becomes identical with a cohort or
vintage where age t is measured by time since birth. The tilde indicates the decomposition
in annual cohorts or population vintages ˜ Nt. We now take the age dependent survival rates
˜ γt from oﬃcial mortality tables and construct the cohort composition of the population
in a demographic steady state. Recursively applying ˜ Nt =˜ γt−1 ˜ Nt−1 y i e l d st h es i z eo f
cohort t relative to the size of a new cohort. Summing up over all cohorts ﬁxes the size
of the new cohort compared to total population size N,
˜ N














20Taking a total length of life of T years, and based on actual survival rates, we have thus
found the stationary decomposition of the population into a total of T cohorts or vintages.
Alternatively, the total population may be decomposed into broader age groups Na with









For the sake of concreteness, assume that total life-time consists of T =7 0periods as
in Table 1 which considers the active population starting at age 20 and living until age 90.
The total population is divided into a cross section of eight age groups. The ﬁrst six are
equally spaced and contain 10 cohorts each, the very old are subdivided into two smaller
groups with ﬁve cohorts each. The ﬁrst group contains vintages N1 =
P29
t=20 ˜ Nt.L i n e3
of Table 1 lists the population shares that obtain from actual, non-stationary population
data. Line 4 reports the shares that result from a stationary population distribution.
Table 1: Demographic and Life-Cycle Parameters
1. Age groups 12345678
2. Cohorts 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-84 85-89
3. Data Na/N 0.168 0.222 0.192 0.168 0.120 0.089 0.025 0.016
4. Model Na/N 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.107 0.031 0.016
5. Labor prod. θ
a 1.000 1.362 1.561 1.582 1.295 0.000 0.000 0.000
6. Prob. 1 − γa 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.042 0.096 0.200
7. Prob. 1 − ωa 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.089 0.074 0.061 0.115 0.000
8. Factor Ωa 1.017 1.024 1.032 1.039 1.040 1.063 1.080 1.000
9. Propens. 1/∆a 0.045 0.049 0.056 0.067 0.083 0.108 0.166 0.227
Notes: θ
a life-cycle labor productivity determines wage wa = wθ
a, 1−γa probabil-
ity of dying, 1−ωa probability of aging, Ωa magniﬁcation interest factor reﬂecting
increase in mortality, 1/∆a marginal propensity to consume. Data sources: BFS
(2004a), and own calculations.
Calibration must assure that the average behavior of age groups in the EA model
(line 1 in Table 1) replicates the average behavior of the cohorts that deﬁne these age
21groups (line 2). Line 2 deﬁnes an aggregation key which collects cohorts in corresponding
age groups. This aggregation key corresponds to a particular life-cycle biography α =
(20,30,40,...,80,85) where α1 =2 0is the date of birth, i.e. the true age when an agent
starts economic life. The ﬁrst requirement is that that the total mass of the age groups
is identical to the mass of cohorts in line 4 which deﬁne these groups. Therefore, the


















1 = n. (31)
At any date in time, the instantaneous probability of staying in group a is ωaγa which
implies an expected duration of 1/(1 − ωaγa) in group a. To pin down the remaining
degrees of freedom, we impose as a second restriction that the expected number of years
spent in group a is equal to the number of life-cycle cohorts that are collected in this
group. Taking the aggregation key α =( 2 0 ,30,40,...,80,85),w eh a v e
αa+1 − αa =1 /(1 − ω
aγ
a). (32)
Knowing Na from aggregated population data and γaωa from age group duration
as implied by the chosen aggregation key, one can pin down demographic parameters
by the following recursive procedure. Knowing γa and ωa, equations (31-32) are solved
simultaneously for γa−1 and ωa−1. We start the recursion with the last group where γA
follows directly from (31) on account of the restriction ωA =1 . Lines 6 and 7 of Table
1 list the resulting values of the exit probabilities. Figure 1 illustrates how these values
approximate the true mortality rates from demographic data. The step function reﬂects
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Fig. 1: Actual and Calibrated Mortality Rates
As a next step, one uses actual wage data to ﬁnd the life-cycle productivity parameters
θ
a. For any given wage per eﬃciency unit of labor one obtains wages wa = wθ
a.T h el i f e -
cycle proﬁles of annual wages ˜ wt are readily available from cohort data. We now require
that the uniform, group speciﬁcw a g ewa is equal to the average of cohort speciﬁcw a g e s






t · ˜ N
t/N
a. (33)
Figure 2 illustrates how (33) approximates the empirical wage proﬁle. The solid, ragged
line shows actual wage data for each cohort in Switzerland 2000. The solid step function
with 10 year intervals corresponds to line 5 in Table 1. Note that the wage of group 5
is an average of a relatively high wage prior to and a zero wage after retirement when
people are in their late sixties. The dashed line with 20 year intervals represents only 4 age
groups with the ﬁrst three comprising 20 cohorts and the last one 10 cohorts. Obviously,
the approximation is crude for periods early and late in the life-cycle while it makes not
23much diﬀerence for agents in their mid-life. Finally, the dashed line with 5 year intervals
c o m e sm u c hc l o s e rt ot h et r u ew a g ep r o ﬁle by taking averages over fewer cohorts. The
gains in empirical approximation are highest for the youngest cohorts facing a steep wage














Fig. 2: Life-Cycle Wages. Data source: BFS (2004)
Line 8 in Table 1 lists the factor Ωa which reﬂects the agents’ response to increasing
ﬁniteness of life over the life-cycle. The discussion of proposition 3 showed that the
marginal propensity to consume rises as the end of life, in the sense of a shorter remaining
expected life-time, approaches. Agents are less inclined to postpone consumption when
mortality is high and when the fruits of savings might thus not be enjoyed. Consequently,
agents value current consumption in state a +1relatively more than in state a where
mortality is still low. The marginal rate of substitution, measuring the amount of income
t ob eg i v e nu pi ns t a t ea for an extra Euro of consumption and income in state a +1 ,i s
thus large when mortality in state a+1is high compared to state a. This higher value of
24the marginal rate of substitution works like a magniﬁcation Ωa > 1 of the interest factor.
Intuitively, agents start to discount the future more heavily, at an eﬀective rate ΩaR,a st h e
end of life becomes a more probable event. Inspecting the marginal propensity to consume
in a steady state, 1/∆a =1− γaβ
σ (ΩaR)
σ−1,o n eﬁnds that the increasing ﬁniteness of
life raises it for two reasons. First, the declining survival probability γa directly raises
the consumption propensity. Second, this eﬀect is magniﬁed by the presence of Ωa > 1.
If 1/∆a rises for older groups, then ∆a+1/∆a < 1, implying Λa > 1 and Ωa > 1.L i n e s8
and 9 of Table 1 clearly illustrate these life-cycle features. As is typical for OLG models,
consumption propensities increase substantially as agents move to higher age groups,
reﬂecting a shorter remaining expected life-time.
4.2 Economic Parameters
Table 2 states key parameters that characterize preferences and technology. These are
commonly used values as in Altig et al. (2001) and Blundell et al. (2003), for example,
or in the real business cycle literature as in Baxter and King (1993) or King, Plosser, and
Rebelo (1988). To keep the discussion short, we refer to these papers for a discussion
and review of the econometric literature. The subjective discount rate is calibrated to
replicate savings. The replacement rate gives the size of the pension compared to the
last net wage income. While in many European countries with generous PAYG old age
insurance systems, a replacement rate of around 70% would be typical, the PAYG system
plays a much smaller role in Switzerland where it is complemented by a substantial asset
backed, funded component. The replacement rate of the PAYG part is thus only 38%. Tax
revenue is used to ﬁnance government consumption and pension payments and requires a
wage tax rate of 30%.
To capture the labor market eﬀects of demographic change in more detail, we have
extended the basic EA model in the Appendix to include endogenous labor supply. These
extensions refer to the intensive (hours worked) and extensive margins (retirement, or
participation decision of workers near retirement) of labor supply. Essentially, workers
25supply more hours if the net of tax wage increases. The participation/retirement decision
of workers in age group 5, corresponding to people in their sixties, reﬂects the diﬀerence
between work and retirement income. The larger the diﬀerence, the more agents ﬁnd it
worthwhile to postpone retirement so that the participation rate in this group increases.
The retirement elasticity is taken from empirical studies. Börsch-Supan (2000) estimates
that a decrease in beneﬁts by 12% would reduce the retirement probability of the 60 years
old from 39.3% to 28.1%. The corresponding increase in the participation rate amounts
to a semi-elasticity of retirement equal to one.
Table 2: Taste and Technology Parameters
Real interest rate r 0.050
Depreciation rate δ 0.100
Output elasticity of capital α 0.350
Subjective discount factor β 0.983
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ 0.400
Wage elasticity of labor supply εL 0.400
Semi-elasticity of retirement εR 1.000
Proportional wage tax rate tW 0.308
Pension replacement rate ζ 0.381
Notes: The labor supply elasticity is εL ≡ ϕ0/(lϕ00),
the pension replacement rate ζ = p/[(1−tW)wθ
aR−1],
and the production function Q = XKα(ZL)1−α.
5 Demographic Change
5.1 Baby Boom
To demonstrate the usefulness and ﬂexibility of the EA model, we choose two key scenarios
of demographic change where the standard perpetual youth model is most restrictive. The
ﬁrst scenario mimics the consequences of a temporary baby boom. We raise the inﬂow of
newborns by 30 percent over a 20 year period, and then set it back to the original value
26in the initial demographic steady state. A demographic shock of this scale is not without
precedent. According to Russell (1982), the number of births in the US amounted to
76 million over the period 1946-64 which is 17 million or 28.9% more than over the 18
years preceding the baby boom. With no other disturbances, the economy will eventually
return to the initial equilibrium over a prolonged adjustment period.
Figure 3 illustrates how the EA model captures the demographic impact of the tem-
porary baby boom. The ﬁrst age group which collects all agents with characteristics of
people in their twenties, rapidly grows larger. It attains its maximum size in period 2020
w h e r ei te x c e e d si t si n i t i a ls i z eb y2 6 % . S o m eo ft h e s en e w c o m e r sm o v er a t h e re a r l yt o
the next group of economic age. With some delay, age group two with characteristics of
people in their thirties starts to grow as well. This group attains maximum size somewhat
later in period 2023 when it is 19% larger than in the initial equilibrium. As is evident
from Figure 3, higher age groups grow even slower and take much longer to reach max-
imum size, and the increase compared to the initial steady state becomes smaller. The


















Fig. 3: Demographic Impact of a Baby Boom
Figure 4 shows how a temporary baby boom might result in large swings in the net
foreign asset position. In an open economy, net foreign assets D = A−V K as in (27) are
equal to the stock of household sector ﬁnancial wealth minus the value of the domestic
capital stock (ﬁrm value), and thus reﬂect the imbalance between domestic savings and
27investment. Since the net foreign asset position is a predetermined variable, it starts out
from zero. The instantaneous decline in domestic ﬁnancial assets reﬂects a windfall loss
in ﬁrm values V K. Given a predetermined value of net foreign assets, this leads to an
instantaneous decline of household sector assets in exactly the same amount, as Figure 4
illustrates. As the baby boom continues, aggregate labor supply grows over a prolonged
period and gets reversed again when the baby boom ends. Capital accumulation, and
therefore the value of the capital stock as plotted in Figure 4, follow closely the same
hump shaped pattern. However, due to the slow demographic process, it takes much longer
until the increased labor income actually translates into an increase in aggregate ﬁnancial
wealth A. Since the value of capital outpaces accumulated savings of domestic households,
the diﬀerence must be borrowed on world capital markets, leading to a prolonged period
of current account deﬁcits and increasing net foreign debt. After the baby boom ends
and the birth rate is back to normal, the domestic capital stock declines again to follow
the shrinking labor force. Aggregate assets continue to increase on account of the savings
of the baby boomers which reverses the growth of net foreign assets. After slightly more
than four decades, the net asset position turns positive and reaches a maximum after

























Net foreign assets GDP ratio
Firm value (percentage change, right scale)
Assets (percentage change, right scale)
Fig. 4: Baby Boom and Net Foreign Assets.
285.2 Higher Life-Expectancy
The second scenario is an aging scenario where people become older on average and
potentially live longer. The two statements are not identical. The ﬁrst one means that
the mass of people in their 80s becomes larger if more of the younger agents make it to
their 80s. The second one means that the life-time horizon becomes longer. To implement
the scenario, we raise the survival rates of age groups 5 to 8 by the factors given in line
4 of Table 3 but keep the expected duration in each age group constant. When people
in their seventies become less mortal, they have a higher chance of reaching the next age
group of people in their eighties.5 Comparing columns 6 in Tables 1 and 3 shows that the
mortality rate 1 − γa of this group declines from .042 to .023 which necessarily implies
that a larger fraction of this group moves to the next one, instead of dying. The transition
rate of aging 1 − ωa increases from .061 to .079. Finally, since the last group becomes
less mortal, 1 − γ8 f a l l i n gf r o m. 2t o. 1 2 ,e x p e c t e dd u r a t i o ni nt h a tg r o u pr i s e sf r o m5t o
(1 − γ8)
−1 =8 .3 years. The representative agent lives longer, 93.3 instead of 90 years.6
Table 3: Aging and Life-Expectancy
1. Age groups 12345678
2. Initial Na .179 .177 .175 .168 .148 .107 .031 .016
3. New Na .167 .165 .163 .156 .138 .113 .044 .054
4. Factor ×γa 1111 1 . 0 1 1 . 0 2 1 . 0 5 1 . 1
5. Prob. 1 − γa .001 .001 .004 .012 .018 .023 .050 .120
6. Prob. 1 − ωa .099 .099 .096 .089 .083 .079 .158 0
Notes: 1 − γa mortality rate, 1 − ωa probability of economic aging.
5People in group 6 are not literally in their seventies. Strictly speaking, group 6 consists of all young
and old agents who share the economic characteristics of people in their seventies. However, the mass
of people in group 6 is equal to the total mass of people belonging to cohorts 70-79 who deﬁne the
characteristics of group 6. See the discussion in section 4.1 and, in particular, equations (30) and (33).
6This last part corresponds to the aging scenario in Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000) who discuss
the implications of longevity in a model with a single mortality rate.
29Since this aging scenario keeps the inﬂow of newborns constant and a larger number
of them makes it to their eighties or even nineties, the scenario also implies an increase
in overall population size of 7.2 percent.7 According to oﬃcial projections, the Swiss
population is expected to largely remain constant in the long-run on account of a parallel
decline in fertility. We suppress this part in order to observe the consequences of aging in
isolation. Instead, we compare the aging scenario for diﬀerent assumptions with regard
to international capital mobility. For this purpose, we have calibrated the model with net
foreign debt equal to zero. In a small open economy, the real interest rate is ﬁx e do nw o r l d
markets. Any imbalance between domestic savings and investment is thus reﬂe c t e di na
change in the net foreign asset position. In a closed economy, the domestic real interest
rate adjusts to keep net foreign assets to zero. This second scenario is interesting as aging
is a worldwide phenomenon that might lead to a decline in the real interest rate.8
This aging scenario highlights the life-cycle properties of the model quite clearly. We
ﬁrst turn to the open economy case. Table 4 column 4 reports the long-run eﬀects in
the baseline scenario. With a constant real interest rate, the capital labor ratio and
gross wages per eﬃciency unit of labor remain constant as well. Aging results in a larger
number of old people which contributes to a larger population. In the absence of an
oﬀsetting decline in fertility, the mass of younger age groups remains almost unchanged,
leading to a largely constant workforce and GDP. By assumption, the increased number
of retirees erodes pensions per capita to an extent that keeps the pensions to GDP ratio
constant. Note, however, that the increase in overall population by about 7% inﬂates
government consumption and thereby necessitates a moderate increase in the wage tax
by 1.3 percentage points.9
7The absolute number of people in younger groups does not change. However, because of the increase
in the overall population, the population shares of worker groups, shown on the third line in Table 3, are
now smaller.
8For example, computations by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2004, p.27) yield a decline in the
return to capital by roughly one percentage point as a result of worldwide aging.
9Pension spending is a constant ratio of GDP, pNR = p0Y , while public consumption is constant per
capita, G = gN. Dividing (A.3) by the wage sum yields tW = p0/(1 − α)+Ng/(wL).W i t hwL largely
30The higher tax erodes the net wage and thereby discourages hours worked at the
intensive margin of labor supply.10 This in itself would lead to lower employment and
output. However, the large reduction in per capita pensions makes retirement less attrac-
tive compared to continued work. With x rising from .45 to .57, postponed retirement
raises aggregate labor supply at the extensive margin. For this reason, the aggregate
workforce expands by 2.3%. This translates in a small increase in eﬀective labor supply
for two reasons. First, active people work fewer hours and, second, the expansion of the
work force occurs with the least productive people in age group 5. The net eﬀect is a
small increase in eﬀective labor supply which is accompanied by an equally small increase
in capital to keep the capital labor ratio constant.11
The last line in Table 4 clearly demonstrates the life-cycle savings response. When
people must expect a much reduced pension from the PAYG system (-18%), they must
substantially increase their savings for retirement even though the interest rate remains
constant. Assets per capita increase by 22%. Since higher survival rates among older
agents swells the population size by about 7.2%, aggregate assets would grow by roughly
30%. In the absence of domestic investment opportunities, this extra wealth is invested
abroad and leads to a net foreign asset position of 71% of GDP in the long-run. The
additional asset income from abroad allows for an increase in aggregate consumption by
roughly ﬁve and a half percent, much higher than the increase in GDP. Consumption per
capita, in contrast, falls by 1.6% which results from population growth due to aging. In
column 5 we report the results from a simulation using a retirement semi-elasticity of
constant, the wage tax rate must rise due to increasing N.
10The appendix introduces endogenous labor supply by allowing for variable hours worked and variable
retirement. In age group 5, agents choose the “retirement date” x which determines the participation




5l5 +( 1− x)p thus reﬂects the extensive margin
of labor supply.
11Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2007) emphasize the life-cycle labor supply and unemployment
incidence of younger and older age groups of workers as a result of pension reform. These authors also
introduce an explicite welfare analysis and report the intergenerational redistribution as well as aggregate
welfare consequences of policy reform.
310.3, compared to 1 in the baseline case. Consequently, retirement is still postponed but
to a smaller degree. The participation rate in age group 5 corresponding to workers in
their 60s rises only to 49%, instead of 57%. The weaker participation response leads to
an overall decline in eﬀective employment. Compared to column 4, the increase in the
number of workers is now overcompensated by the decrease in individual labor supply
due to lower net wages.
Table 4: Long-Run Impact of Aging
Key Macro Variables in % Closed Open Open†
r real interest* ( 0.050 ) 0.040 0.050 0.050
Df/Y debt GDP ratio* ( 0.000 ) 0.000 0.710 0.864
x retirement date* ( 0.450 ) 0.632 0.569 0.493
tW contribution rate* ( 0.308 ) 0.304 0.321 0.325
p pension per capita -8.469 -17.737 -22.060
(1 − tW)w net wage 4.444 -1.918 -2.488
l labor supply 1.754 -0.772 -1.003
NW workers 3.519 2.297 0.831
NR retirees 19.274 23.250 28.019
LD employment (eﬀective) 5.150 1.390 -0.222
K capital stock 17.057 1.390 -0.222
Y gross dom.prod, GDP 9.173 1.390 -0.222
C consumption per capita -0.522 -1.582 -2.427
A assets per capita 8.120 21.953 25.862
Note: Pension/GDP ratio and public consumption per capita con-
stant. %) Percent changes relative to ISS. *) Absolute values, initial
values in brackets. †) Simulation with εR =0 .3.
Adjustment in the closed economy would be much diﬀerent, as column “Closed” in
Table 4 demonstrates. If the excess savings cannot be invested abroad, the real interest
must decline, by 1 percentage point, to balance savings and investment. With production
much more capital intensive, wages rise substantially by 4.4% in the long-run and thereby
32stimulate labor supply both on the intensive and extensive margins. People work more
hours (+1.8%), and they postpone retirement as work becomes more attractive relative
to pension income. The expansion of eﬀective employment in combination with higher
capital intensity boosts the capital stock by 17.1% in the long-run, leading to an output
gain of more than 9%. Keeping the pension to GDP ratio constant, the country thus
aﬀords an overall increase in pension expenditure which substantially cushions the decline
in per capita pensions of 8.5%, instead of 17.7% in the open economy. The decline in
the real interest rate in combination with a smaller decline in pensions per capita much
reduces savings incentives, leading to a quite impressive long-run reduction in accumulated
assets. Consequently, income from savings falls relative to the open economy scenario.
Yet, aggregate consumption per capita now shrinks by only halve a percent, compared to
1.6% in the open economy. Higher disposable wages substitute for lower capital income.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
T h en o t i o no fe c o n o m i ca g i n gs e p a r a t e se c o n o m i ca g ef r o mt i m es i n c eb i r t h . E c o n o m i c
a g ei sd e ﬁned by a set of personal characteristics such as labor productivity, mortality,
tastes, health, etc. that change less frequently over the life-cycle than periods since birth.
People can retain their characteristics over several periods before they change as a result
of aging. Economic aging occurs stochastically. Identifying a person with her biography
which is the sequence of discrete aging events since birth, allows to analytically aggregate
a multitude of diﬀerent generations into a low number of age groups. The EA model is
thus a generalized OLG model.
In standard OLG models such as the most recent versions of the Auerbach and Kot-
likoﬀ (1987) framework, aging occurs every period and the probability of dying is unity
in the last period of life. The number of life-cycle periods corresponds to the number of
age groups or cohorts. As Laitner (1990) has shown, typical models with 55 generations
operate in a state space of 108 dimensions and are thus very expensive to implement. If
33aging occurs less frequently, the number of age groups becomes smaller than the number
of cohorts. In this paper, we approximated the life-cycle with eight age states. Counting
as in Laitner (1990), the state space would be 14 instead of 108 dimensions. This low
dimensionality greatly facilitates the empirical implementation and numerical solution
of the model. First applications relating to a temporary baby boom and an increased
longevity of life have demonstrated that the EA model is a much more powerful tool for
quantitative empirical analysis of demographic change, compared to the perpetual youth
model due to Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1968) as well as the recent extension by Gertler
(1998) with two age groups. These models are popular because of analytical tractability
and their simple empirical implementation. Yet they are quite limited when it comes
to trace out the life-cycle implications of certain shocks or to investigate demographic
change. The EA model is in between the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ and Blanchard-Yaari mod-
els, allowing for analytical aggregation to a low number of age groups combined with a
realistic modeling of the life-cycle and demographic change. It would be an interesting
and important research topic to investigate how the choice of more or fewer states of
economic age aﬀects the quality of life-cycle approximation and the short- and long-run
dynamic properties of the general equilibrium model.
Appendix: Endogenous Labor Supply and Retirement
Consider age group a = aR with characteristics of people in their sixties. Assume that
af r a c t i o nx of this group is still active while the rest is retired. To retain symmetry, we
assume that each agent receives a share x of her labor income as wages and a share 1−x
as an old age pension. A higher value of x means postponed retirement and therefore
a higher participation rate in this mixed group which reﬂects the extensive margin of
l a b o rs u p p l y .W er e f e rt ox as the retirement date since postponed retirement raises the
share of wages in average labor income in that period. If actively employed, agents may
work a variable number of la hours, reﬂecting the intensive margin. They trade oﬀ the
income and consumption against disutility of work, both on the intensive and extensive
34margins. A particularly simple and yet realistic approach is to exclude income eﬀects.12
We thus assume an additively separable subutility over consumption and foregone leisure,
¯ Ca ≡ Ca − xϕ(la) − ψ(x),w h e r eϕ(l) and ψ(x) stand for convex disutility of work and
postponed retirement, ϕ0,ψ
0 > 0 and ϕ00,ψ





























































A simple solution in three stages is possible. First, choose intensive and extensive labor












t) − pt = ψ
0 (xt). (A.2)
Intensive labor supply exclusively depends on the current wage. The wage elasticity is
determined by the curvature of ϕ. On the extensive margin, the chosen retirement date
reﬂects the diﬀerence between utility adjusted wages and alternative pension income. The
more generous pensions are relative to net wages, the less people are inclined to incur the
utility cost of postponed retirement, and the earlier they choose to retire. The share of
wages in average labor income declines. Since wages and pensions are independent of
history, labor supply and the retirement date are symmetric, la
α,t = la
t and xα,t = xt.T h e
s a m eh o l d sf o ra v e r a g ea n de ﬀort adjusted labor income, ya
t and ¯ ya
t, respectively.
The second step solves the intertemporal problem in (A.1.i-ii) of allocating subutility
¯ Ca
α,t over time exactly as in Proposition 3, except that C is replaced by ¯ C and y by ¯ y.
12Excluding income eﬀects is quite common in the literature on optimal income taxation or on real
business cycles. See, for example, Heijdra (1998) and Greenwood et al. (1988) in intertemporal macroeco-
nomics, Saez (2002) and Immervoll et al. (2004) on optimal income taxation, and Cremer and Pestieau
(2003) for modeling postponed retirement this way.
35The solution of the ﬁrst two steps give optimal values for ¯ C, l and x. As a last step, it
remains to compute optimal commodity consumption Ca
α,t by inverting (A.1.iii).
For all age groups a<a R, the labor supply is reduced to the intensive dimension only.
Consequently, x =1in (A.1) and ψ is a constant that is set to zero. Finally, age groups
a>a R are fully retired. Endogenous labor supply also leads to modiﬁcation of ﬁscal
budget balance tWwtLS
t = ptNR
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